"'*4

.

wr

"t

~'1!iI.!tlm!:'ttm3w-mw.'."

£,,,,ere·0\·"Yt''EY'''vo=··

~",'

'O,".,=",._j>t

""''''M~

TOE POS,SIBILITY
S&'T'
-ING T'~ D'"
:~
~" ~.~
'_ ,m ."~ Ti
_. ).-!.4
L".(m
011"
.-l~
. ". :-p
~N!,1"-fA,
ti O
-at: .l1l"
_ JL1i_, _ "L
I_.", "rs''S'''IJ
i

~

-:

'.~

~~;_.

SUFFERING ON
RATIONAL GROUNDS
Judith Barad
Indiana State University

Professor Scriven's overall criticisms of
utilitarianism as a justification for extending moral
concern to animals are well argued. However, I do
not think these criticisms warrant the conclusion
that the "issue of how much we ought to be
concerned about the suffering of animals is ...
impossible to settle on rational grounds." Other
rational grounds than utilitarianism can provide
strong foundations on which to establish how much
we ought to be concerned about the suffering of
animals. Generally, I think inadequate attention has
been given to an objective analysis of the ontological
status of animals, an issue which some deontologists
hold to be relevant to the moral status of animals. I
will comment on Professor Scriven's paper in the
order in which it is written before returning to this
point.

Jim Harter, Animal:l: 1419
COpyright-Free lUustralions.
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The assumption underlying Professor Scriven's
dismissal of deontological theories of animal rights
seems to be that unless a theory rests on tradition, it
cannot adequately support its claims. But narrowly
confining ourselves to traditional philosophical
views would result in turning back the clock on
significant social and moral progress. For example, if
we strictly adhered to Aristotle's views on the
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ontological status of women, we would fail to see the
basis for extending equal rights to women. For a
moral theory to be socially relevant, it should not
ignore the findings of the empirical'sciences. In the
case of nonhuman animals, evolutionary theory has
implications which are relevant to any deontological
argument seeking to base rights upon a being's
capacities or interests. Consequently, both
nontraditional deontological theories and modified
traditional deontological theories can add significant
contributions to the debate over animals rights.
Turning from deontology to preference
utilitarianism, Professor Scriven criticizes Singer for
inferring mental states from behavior, a criticism
which could also apply to Regan. This passage is
particularly problematic, in my view, for three
reasons. First, neither Singer nor Regan can ever
claim that animals are cognitively complicated
enough to count as moral agents. In fact, Regan
specifically says the animals are moral patients and
not moral agents)

very point at issue.2 Rats are very popular animals for
pain experiments, a fact which would make little
sense if they do not know when they are in pain. A
rat knows when he is in pain, for when the scientist
applies an irritating substance to his paw he behaves
in a way consistent with how a being aware of pain
would be expected to act. If we use the word "know"
in the sense of "to be aware of,") then it is plausible
to maintain that rats, like any other mammal, know
when they are in pain. However, if we use the word
"know" to mean some higher order cognitive
capacity such as "to reflect on," then a person being
stabbed with a knife cannot be said to "know" he is
in pain.

The only reason not to
attribute mental states to
animals on the basis of their
behavior, and yet on the
same basis attribute mental
states to human beings, is
the prejudice known as
speciesism.

Secondly, if we did not infer mental states from
behavior, we would have no reason to help release
someone from under a car who we see screaming and
flailing around. Simply being under a car is not a
sufficient reason to help this person, for he (a
mechanic) may want to be there. The reason we
would help him is that his behavior leads us to infer
that his mental state is one of pain rather than
pleasure. Generally, a result of failing to infer mental
states from behavior would be increased indifference
to the plight of others. The only way we recognize
that others possess mental states other than by their
behavior is by verbal articulation. Thus, if it is
illegitimate to infer mental states from behavior, and
if a person is not in the process of articulating his
mental state to us, we cannot justifiably assume he is
having one. If we do infer a mental state when a
person is not using language, then "to the
unconvinced," using Professor Scriven's words, "the
inference is bound to look like so much question
begging." Indeed, the only reason not to attribute
mental states to animals on the basis of their
behavior, and yet on the same basis attribute mental
states to human beings, is the prejudice known as
speciesism.

The strongest arguments of Professor Scriven's
paper are his criticisms of the utilitarian defense of
animals. To base an animal's treatment on a
favorable balance of pleasure over pain still leaves
unanswered the important question of whether it is
morally permissible to painlessly kill an animal.
Analyzing the justification of utilitarianism in
regard to the animals issue, Professor Scriven
examines the role of conscience. He argues that the
only reason to have a conscience is self. interest and
that "conscience is the result of programming."
Granting that almost all utilitarians hold this view,
the question of its truth remains. In cases where
children react with horror and moral indignation
upon seeing an animal killed, without
encouragement from "moral teachers," the
explanatory power of conscience as programming

Finally, the rhetorical questions about rats and
chickens knowing when they are in pain beg the
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loses its force. Other philosophical views of
conscience may be better able to take account of
such responses. One such view, held by Aquinas,
describes conscience as the result of both direct
intuition into universal principles of action and of
acquired knowledge and experience. He argues that
conscience is an act of judgment which evaluates a
particular action in view of a universal principle.
Unlike behavioral programming, it cannot be
extinguished, but it can be repressed. This view of
conscience, although allowing for subjective factors,
is not an artificially contrived response to societal
norms for the sake of self-interest. Unlike the
utilitarian conception, its emphasis on universal
principles allows for altruism. The "Thou shall not
kill" in this account of conscience does not
differentiate between an American or an Ethiopian,
for it is not based on such subjective factors as self
interest or the degree to which a being is like me.

doctrine of conscience as self-interest. For an
environmentalist may act to save. redwoods out of
altruistic concern that the entire planet not lose one
of its most beautiful natural resources, even though
knowing that he himself will never have the
opportunity to experience their majesty.
Generally, to continually equate the ontological
and moral status of fetuses and animals as Professor
Scriven does (at least seven times) is an unwarranted
assumption. As I pointed out, both antiabortionists
and animal advocates could argue that the alleged
equivalence is specious. Speaking for the animal
advocates, it is a fact beyond speculation that
nonhuman mammals can respond to their
environment by moving to different locations,
pursuing what they are attracted to and avoiding
that which they perceive to be harmful. That a fetus
can do so is more speculative. Given that whether or
not a being should be extended certain rights is
relevant to its possessing certain capacities, why
should a two month old fetus be extended the same
moral consideration as an adult chimpanzee?
Observing a mother cow responding affectionately to
her calf or lion cubs playfully interacting, it is
legitimate to ask whether moral agents should
respect these social abilities. On the other hand, it is
just as pOintless to consider whether or not to respect
the social ability of the fetus as it is to consider
whether or not to respect the right of a man to jump
from the earth to the moon.

Emotively, Professor Scriven's observation is
correct that my concern for my family is indeed
greater than my concern for Ethiopians. But it is
conscience which informs me that it is as morally
wrong for the one to be killed as the other.
Subjective preference can and should be
distinguished from moral judgment. Logically, I
disagree with Professor Scriven that the self
interested account of conscience encounters a
"hitch" in the analysis of criteria to judge which
beings "are enough like me to warrant my respect
and benevolence." Vegetarian feminists may claim
that developed mammals which can use their
capacities to enjoy their lives independent of others
are not on the same ontological level as human
fetuses, which are only in the process of developing
into physically independent entities. If the
vegetarian feminist subscribes to the self-interest
theory, she could say that the chimp is like her in
these respects whereas the fetus is not. Turning to
Scriven's second example, a meateating
antiabortionist may claim that although fetuses have
the potential to develop into fully rational beings,
chimps do not have this potential. Again, an
antiabortionist proponent of self-interest would say
that the fetus resembles him in this respect whereas
the chimp does not. I do not grasp the point of the
last example, since it is unlikely that a vegetarian
environmentalist could claim to be like a redwood.
In fact, the last example undermines the whole

Ignoring an ontological asymmetry, Professor
Scriven implies that we should not have the same
concern for fetuses and cows as we have for our pets
and our children. Although the fetus is clearly less
developed and occupies a different ontological level
from my child, it is not equally clear that a cow is a
less developed being than my dog. Both the cow and
the dog are physically independent mammals that
have capacities to enjoy their own lives and pursue
their own ends. The primary difference is a
subjective one on the part of the pet owner based on
emotional factors. But objectively speaking, does a
dog have more intrinsic value than a cow?
Given that Professor Scriven has only
. considered subjective criteria for deciding who is
qualified for membership in the moral community, I
agree that such decisions are dangerous and would
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have terrible consequences. Nevertheless, it is not
clear that objective criteria are similarly undesirable.
For example, a being's ontological status as measured
by its general psychological and physiological
capacities could provide a criterion that is relatively
free from prejudice for membership in the moral
community.

ON LOSING OUR YOUNG
I

A nest built itself in summer
burden basket, bag ofmedicine
therein an exquisite cry
with babiest frail fledgling wrapped around this cry
with claw nagging heart fabric and pull
In our surroundings everything swelling, filling with
Iiquid
blackberries burst to the ditch, exhausted
Mexicans were propping up gravenstein trees with
boards
and the apples fell like bombs
honeysuckle spilling over fences drifting towards
dogs
corn was cross-breeding and we didn't even know
growing peculiar blue and yellow jewels beneath its
skin
eucalyptus called to us with their medicinal oil
ocean breaking coagulated sun

The only warranted conclusion that can be
drawn from Scriven's paper is that utilitarianism
cannot provide adequate grounds for justifying the
belief that animals should fall within our moral
concern. But to admit that utilitarian theory is not
up to this task does not automatically exclude other
rational grounds for deciding how much we ought to
be concerned about the suffering of animals.
Consequently, by narrowing the field of theories
available to those who seek to put the treatment of
animals on a rational basis, Professor Scriven's paper
has pointed toward more fertile theories which may
justify the argument for animal rights.
0

II

Night fell- a redwood with moon pinned under
towards us wind tore down the road
hunted something down the chimney
windows blew out, stove ended up clear over there
horses trying to gain on themselves in galloping
circles
saw blowing world ran to beach looking for altar
the original one
where my sisters moontide had rose red on the
hearth
I lay with everything running out
broken wishbone in hand
raining body ofwater
A mare In the wind that heart kicked against my
chest
You never left bent nest
but through these tears, a membrane of jewels
I envision you rising up every few minutes
out of my hands
taking wing over and over
a long thread of my sinew rides off with you
flying above queen anne's lace, seductive datura
dancing
in stripped stubble offield, wall offog
the coastline rocks
and Into the vortex, wings dripping light

ITom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1983), pp. 151-156.
20r. Irene Pepperberg at Northwestern University has
conducted research on Alex, an African grey parrot, to determine
whether or not he is capable of cognitive processes. She
concludes, "What we've learned that we can do with him is to
work with objects he's never before seen and question him about
those objects, and he responds equally well, so obviously, some
degree of processing is going on in his mind." If one species of bird
can think isn't it premature to rule out-of-hand that other species
of birds are incapable of thought?
Moreover, it is noteworthy that recently scientists have
gathered from all over to discuss how and what animals think at a
conference at Williams College in western Massachusetts. For
animal behaviorists and cognitive ethologists it is no longer a
question of if animals think.

3Webster's Dictionary.

Amy Trussell
Summer, 1986
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